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NOTE AND COMMENT 
BASEBALL AND THS Jun1cIARY-The acceptance by Judge Kenesaw Moun-
tain Landis of the position of supreme arbiter of professional baseball, as 
recently announced, raises questions of good taste if not of propriety. It 
has been generally assumed that Judges of the District Court of the United 
States have their hands amply full if they do the work incumbent upon 
them in a way befitting a judge of the United States. It may well be true 
that the salary provided by the Goverq:ment is grossly inadequate, but we 
dare say that no one has considered that the remedy for such condition was 
to be found through outside jobs paying additional compensation. 
A man receiving a salary of $42,soo per year, the amount which it is 
said Judge Landis is to get from baseball, may reasonably be expected even 
in these days of high wages to give at le~t a considerable portion of his 
energies and time to the work for which he receives such sum. It would 
seem inevitable that the public service must suffer by such division of effort. 
It must be further evident that it is the official position which Judge 
Landis holds and the really splendid record he has made in clearing up cer-
tain types of fraudulent and criminal practices that make him peculiarly 
acceptable to the baseball magnates. But for his judgeship he would prob-
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ably be no more. fitted or desired than thousands of able men interested in 
the national game. It appears to us that Judge Landis is prostituting his 
high office ior the sake of a commercialized, professional sport. 
If the distinguished jurist had resigned in. order to accept his baseball 
position there might have been some to regret such yielding to the call of 
the flesh pots, but all would have agreed that such step was for Judge 
Landis alone to determine. We believe that among lawyers and the public 
generally the opinion must be widespread that Judge Landis in attempting 
to hold both positions is guilty of extremely bad taste, to say the least, and 
that it is a gross impropriety for him to make use of his judicial position 
and prestige to help him out as "czar of baseball." He ought to resign. 
Otherwise we may expect to see other ittdges with dulled senses of propriety 
accepting various more or less .lucrative side-employments for which their 
offices make them peculiarly desirable. 
MUNICIPAL ZoNING.-Modern City Planning is of recent origin, but of 
rapid growth. It began in Prussia less than fifty .years ago. It soon spread 
to adjoining countries, and reached the United States about twenty years ago. 
Its primary object is to control the physical structure of the city, by 
controlling the real property within its actual or prospective limits. This 
property is either public or private. The public property is controlled, in 
the main, through public ownership; private, throtrgh regulation. 
These regulations, recently, have taken the form of Zoning,-regulating 
by prescribed districts' the kinds of buildings erected, the portion of the lot 
covered, and the uses to which both are put, within the districts. 
The New York ordinance of July 25, 1916, is a typical one of the best 
kind. It includes height, area, and use regulations. It creates districts in 
which the allowable heights of buildings are 2!~. 2, I~, 1'4, and I times 
the width of the adjacent street at the building line, with a set-back of one 
foot for every four feet above that height; if the street is over 100 feet wide 
no additional height is allowed; and if ttnder 50 feet, the building may be 
as high as if the street were that wide. There is no limit to the height of 
towers, steeples, and chimneys. 
Under area regulations, the districts are: A, warehouses, storage, and 
industrial establishments, which may cover 100 per cent of the lot; B, large 
office and high apartment buildings, - per cent; C, non-elevator apartment 
houses; etc., - per cent; D, one- and two-family private residences in blocks, 
- per cent; E, private detached residences, where new buildings may not 
cover over 30 per cent of the lot. 
Under use regulations, the districts are: Unrestricted, all sorts of build-
ings and factories allowable; Busiiiess, business and residences both·allowed; 
Residence, business and factories excluded, but clubs, churches, schools, 
libraries, etc., allowed. Three maps are made showing the districts accord-
ing to the character of the regulations. The districts made on one basis 
need not coincide with those made on another basis. 
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Los Angeles, St. Louis, Detroit, Akron, Portland, Ore., and many other 
cities have recently passed similar ordinances. 
These regulations have been made under 1:he Eminent Domain, the 
Police, or the Ta:ring power. In some cases, by ordinance only, under gen-
eral charter powers; in some; by ordinance, under special "Home Rule" 
charter provisions; in some, under express statutory authority, without con-
stitutional provision; and in some, under authority supported by constitu-
tional provision. 
The general nature and limits of the taxing, police, and eminent domain 
powers, in relation to this subject, have been treated in a note in the M1c1t. 
L. Rsv., Vol. XVIII (April, 1920), pp. 523-528. The purpose of this note 
is only to review the important cases decided 1:his year on this subject. 
The first is State v. Houghton, decided by the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota, January 23, 1920 (176 N. W. 158), being a rehearing and reversal 
of the same case decided three months before (October 24. 1919), 174 N. \V. 
885. The attorneys, twelve for the plaintiff and eight for the defendant, 
and the judges (seven in number) were the same in both cases. The majority 
opinion on the first hearing was delivered by Dibell, J., with Holt, ]., writ-
ing a dissenting opinion in which Hallam, J., concurred. The majority 
opinion on the rehearing was by Holt, J., with dissenting 'opinion written 
by Brown, C. ]., concurred in by Dibell, J. 
The action was mandamus to compel the granting of a permit to build 
a three-story apartment building, costing about $50,000, upon Jots owned by 
plaintiff, in Minneapolis, located in a restricted residence district of only 
one block created under Laws of 1915, c. 128. This provided that on the 
petition of 50 per cent of the property to be affected the city council may 
"designate and establish * * * residence districts * * * wherein no building 
shall 1:hereafter be erected, altered, or repaired for any of the fottowing 
purposes, to-wit: hotels, restaurants, eating houses, mercantile business. 
stores, factories, warehouses, printing establishments, tailor shops, coat yards, 
cleaning and laundering establishments, bitl-boards and other advertising 
devices, public garages, public stables, apartment houses, fiat buildings, or 
any other building or structure for purposes similar to the foregoing." 
"The council shalt first designate the restricted residence district, and 
ihall have power to acquire by eminent domain the right to exercise the 
powers granted by this act." 
The council was to appoint appraisers who were to view the premises, 
take testimony, and determine the amount of damages suffered by, and the 
benefits to, each parcel of land in the district; and if the damages exceeded 
the benefits the excess was to be awarded as damages; and if. the benefit!! 
exceeded the damages the difference was to be assessed as benefits; but the 
total assessments of benefits was not to exceed the aggregate iiet award of 
damages. Report was to be made to the council, which, after opportunity 
for a public hearing, might annul or confirm the report. If confirmed, such 
award of damages was to be a charge upon the city, for the payment of 
which ·its credit was pledged. The assessments of benefits were to be a 
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lien upon the parcels of land until paid. On the payment of the awards, 
"the several tracts of land shall he deemed to be taken and appropriated for 
the purposes of this act, and the right above specified shall vest absolutely 
in the city." Maps and plats were to be made of ·the restricted districts and· 
were· to be filed with the city clerk and the register of deeds, with a list of 
the parcels of land within such districts. The ass~ssments were to be col-
lected as other taxes. 
The Constitution provided : 
destroyed or damaged for public 
first paid or secured." 
"Private property shall not be" taken, 
use, without just compensation therefor 
The question involved in both hearings was conceded to be: "Whether 
there is a public use upon which to rest a condenmation?" It was also con-· 
ceded that neither the city nor the public gets any physical use of the con-
demned premises; they cannot travel upon nor occupy them; no part of the 
ground is taken; the use is negative; the taking consists in a restriction of 
the use; it prevents an otherwise lawful use; the owner still owns the land; 
he may keep the people off; he may leave it vacant; he may build any, except 
the forbidden, building; a fifty per cent vote, with the approval of the coun-
cil, has made it so; no considerable part of the public will derive any benefit; 
it will be paid for by assessments for benefits to the residents of the one 
block. 
The decision in the case turned very largely on views of the judges ot 
the nature of apartment buildings. Dibell, J., says: the use is legitimate; 
not all people can live in detached houses; some seek apartments; true, 
apartments are not welcome in exclusive residence districts; their appear-
ance is not liked;. the living conditions they offer are wholesome, and the 
people who use them are good people; they do not affect the public health, 
or public safety, or general well-being; when once the principle is announced 
that on a vote of the majority owners land may be condemned against its 
use for an apartment, it may reach the humble and shabby dwelling, for its 
appearance may be as objectionable as an apartment; and when the humble 
home is threatened by legislation on aesthetic grounds, at the instance of a 
particular class, who would rid themselves of its presence, a step will have 
been taken toward government controlled in the interests of a class rather 
than for the equal protection of all. Condemning property against a build· 
ing which offends only because it is out of harmony with the neighborhood 
surroundings we do not find to be for a public use. 
On the other hand, Holt, J., says: what is a public use is primarily a 
legislative question; many conditions justify this law; people are crowding 
into cities; lots are small; a person buys one and erects a modest building 
for a home; later some one buys the adjoining lots, erects a three or more 
story apartment on ~me side and a store on the other, up to the lot lines; 
the small home is utterly destroyed so far as enjoyment and value as a 
home go. Speculators buy in a desirable residence section and threaten to 
erect structures that will greatly depreciate values, be an eyesore to -owners, 
who are forced to buy at an e.'1.orbitant price or submit to the injury. Public 
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welfare is served by protecting them. That which is appropriated for the 
public welfare is taken for a public use. It is time that courts recognize 
the aesthetic factor in the affairs of life; it promotes the general welfare 
of the dwellers; preserves and enhances values; fosters contentment; cre-
ates civic pride; produces better citizens; property taken for this is taken 
for a public use. The legislature so deemed; there is nothing in the federal 
or state constitutions that forbids. 
To which Brown, C. ]., replies: there is no public use to condemn, on 
the sole claim that an apartment deteriorates property values in the vicinity; 
if so, the owner of vacant land can only improve his laµd by a use that will 
leave the values round about stationary or enhances them. Condemnation 
money is not paid as tribute. However far we follow the argument. we 
return to the question whether a residence district voluntarily organized on 
a 50 per cent vote may exclude from its midst apartments, thoroughly sani-
tary, or an unsightly cottage which is the only possible home the owner can 
build or have. Back of all aesthetic considerations is the disinclination of 
the exclusive district to have in its midst those who dwell in apartments. 
It matters not how mentally fit, or how morally correct, or how decorous 
in conduct they are, they are unwelcome. The statute is aimed in the wrong 
direction, and is not in the promotion of the general welfare. It segregates 
people into classes founded on invidious distinctions, and extends to one the 
powerful eminent domain arm of the state, by which it may on aesthetic or 
fanciful grotinds exclude from their selected neighborhood members. of the 
other class equal in intelligence and moral standing with those temporarily 
vested with this powerful state weapon. 
In 1898 the Massachusetts legislature limited the heights of buildings 
to be erected on lands abutting on Copley Square, Boston; in 1901 St. Louis 
prohibited the erection of business houses on any property on any boule-
vard; in 1910, a bill in Congress proposed to classify the streets of Wash-
ington, and to prohibit any kind of business building on class A streets. 
In all these, provision was made for compensation to the owners of prop-
erty injuriously affected. The English Town Planning Law of 1909 also pro-
vides for compensation according to damage done, and also for the assess-
ment back on to the property benefited of an amount equal to half of the· 
benefits. 
While it has generally been held in the bill-board and building line cases 
that one cannot be deprived of his use of his property for such purposes, 
under the police power, for aesthetic reasons alone, many of these cases 
have intimated that this might be accomplished under the eminent domain 
power; and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Att_orne~ ... 
General v. Williams (1899). 174 Mass. 476, in sustaining the Copley Square 
legislation, intimated that "promoting the beauty of a public park" might be 
a "matter of such public interest as to justify the taking of private prop-
erty." A few out of many bill-board cases are: People v. Green (1903), 85 
App. D. 400; Bill Posting Co. v. Atlantic City (1904), 71 N. J. L. 72; Commw. 
v. Boston Ad11. Co. (1905), 188 Mass. 345; Varne3• & Green. v. Williams 
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(1905); 155 Cal. 318; State v. Lamb (N. J., 1916), g8 Atl. 459; St. Louis v. 
Gu1ming Advt. Co. (19n), 235 Mo. 99; Thomas Cusac/1 Co. v. City of Clii,. 
cago (1914), - Ill.-, 108 N. E. 340 (1917), 242 U. S. 526; contra, Chu1·chin 
v. Collector of Internal Rev. (1915), 14 Off. Gaz. P. I. 383. 
A few building line cases are: St. Louis v. Hill (1893), n6 Mo. 527; 
Eubank v. Richmond (1912), 226 U.S. 137; Fruth v. Board of Affairs (1915), 
75 W. Va. 456. 
For statutory efforts to regulate bill-boards, see note 18 MICH. L. Rr:v., 
p. 527. 
The next case in order is Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Works 
(Utah, Feb. 17, 1920), 187 Pac. 829. Defendant was convicted of violating 
a city ordinance creating a residence district. The city was authorized "to 
direct the location and r.egulate the management and construction of * * * 
foundries * * * in and within one mile" from the city limits ; and to make 
all regulations necessary to provide for the safety, preserve the health, pro-
mote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort 
and convenience of the city and the inhabitants, and fo~ the protection of 
property therein. The defendant bought a lot, obtained a permit to build 
"a building''" thereon, and in April, 1917, began to erect a foundry thereon; 
the property owners protested; conferences followed, and the city offered 
to ·buy the site; the offer was not accepted;. July 23, the ordinance was 
passed establishing the residence district and making it unlawful to erect a 
foundry ·therein, whether it was in operation or not. The defendant's foun-
dry was the only one in the district, but the boundaries of the district were 
so fixed as not to include an operating brass foundry in the vicinity The 
defendant completed his foundry, began to operate it, w~ prosecuted, con-
victed, and appealed. Affirmed. The defendant claimed· that, while +he city 
could exclude objectionable businesses from all the city, it could not exclude 
them from a particular section and allow them to remain in other similar 
sections of the city. The court said that "one •step in the right direction" 
was not conclusive that it "will not take another" in the course of time. 
So long as the legislature has conferred the authority to exclude such busi-
nesses from residential districts, where they would at once become intoler-
able, the courts will not say they have acted unreasonably, nor for merely 
aesthetic purposes. The district is residential; industrial plants within it 
would deprive many owners of the enjoyment of their property, or greatly 
depreciate its value; the police power extends to the needs of the general 
public, and ought not to be questioned on the ground that the exclusion was 
a taking without compensation. 
In Bebb , .• Jordan (Wash., April 22, 1920), 189 Pac. 553, the plaintiff 
sued to recover $10,000 for services in drawing plans and specifications for 
a six-story $100,000 apartment house; before these plans were completed 
the defendant changed his mind and directed new plans for an eight-story 
building; when these plans were completed the estimated cost was $40,000 
more; the defendant then abandoned the'. project, and refused to pay the 
-architect. "The defense made was that the plans were useless, because they 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
did not conform to the city ordinance; they, however, were according to 
the directions given. The building ordinance required, for a building of 
this height, a court area of 168o square feet, but the plans allowed only 1288; 
such building was also to have a back yard 13 feet wide; the plans called 
for a building covering the whole lot. Plaintiff claimed the ordinance was 
unreasonable. The statute authorized the city "to regulate the manner in 
which stone, brick, and other buildings shall be constructed." 
The court 'said that such regulation:; are common, and "if aimed at 
promoting the public health, safety or welfare, and tend reasonably so to 
do,'' they are not open to constitutional objection. The ordinance is valid. 
Olympia v. Mann, l Wash. 389 (fire limits); Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 
468 (fire escape) ; Eubank v. Richmond, IIO Va. 749 (building line on lots 
adjoining a city park); City of Detroit v. Kuhn, 181 Mich 6o4 (15-foot yard 
at the rear of every tenement). The principle of these cases applies here. 
Plaintiff cannot recover for the plans which did not conform to the ordi-
nance. 
The next is an apartment house case, State ex rel. Morris v. East Cleve-
land, in the Common Pleas Court of Obi~ at Cleveland, decided October, 
l9i9, with rehearing April 30, 1920 (31 0. Dec. g8, 197). One Morris applied 
for a permit to build an apartment house on land owned by him in East 
Cleveland. At the time his plans conformed to the building regulations, and 
there was nothing to forbid such a building. A week later the city passed 
a zoning ordinance districting the city according to use, creating district D 
(in which the lot was located), restricted "against manufacture, business 
and tenement use," and reserved "for use as single and double residence 
property only." The permit was denied solely because of the ordinance. 
Mandamus was brought, and denied. It was claimed the ordinance took 
plaintiff's property without compensation, without due process, and denied 
the equal protectiOI11 of the laws. The city claimed it was a valid exercise 
of the police power. The city had a "Home Rule'' charter under constitu-
tional provision giving authority "to exercise all powers of local self-gov-
ernment, and adopt and enforce such local police, sanitary and other sim-
ilar regulations not in conflict with general laws.'· The charter said the 
city "may define, prohibit, abate, suppress and prevent all things detrimental 
to the health, morals, comfort and safety, convenience and welfare of the 
inhabitants of the city." 
Foran, J., held the burden was on the plaintiff to show the ordinance 
was unreasonable and oppressive; and taking judicial knowledge of the sub-
ject, said: "the apartment house is a monstrosity and a deadly menace to 
life, health and morals.'' On the rehearing, after evidence was admitted 
as to the nature of apartment houses, Kramer, J., said· "There could be 
no two opinions that an apartment in a section of private residences is a 
nuisance; it shuts off light and air from its neighbors; it invades their pri-
vacy; it spreads smoke and soot; the noise of deliveries is almost continu-
ous; the fire hazard is increased; the number of people in and out render 
immoral practices more difficult of detection and suppression; the danger 
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of the spread of infectious disease is increased; the erection of an apart-
ment drives out the single residence adjacent, and the whole street is soon 
given over to apartments." Both judges held the ordinance valid, and are 
very much more specific in reference to the menacing character of the 
apartment than any of the judges was in the Houghton case above. In that 
case the decrease in the 'llalue of the adjoining property was ~mphasized, 
and almost nothing was said as to peril to health, safety and morals. The 
Minnesota court had before held a store could not, Wider the police power, 
be excluded from a residence district unless it was a nuisance in the way 
in which it was carried on, and not merely because it· decreased the value of 
adjoining property. State ex rel. Laclitman v. Ho11ghton (1916), 134 Minn. 
226, 158 N. W. 1017. Accord: l:Vilson v. Cooke (1913), 54 Col. 320; People 
ex rel. Friend (1913), 261 Ill. 16. 
In his dissenting opinion in the 14achtman case, Hallam, J., says in ref-
erence to this: "It is said this relator has a vested right guaranteed him 
by the constitution to damage his neighbors' homes by devoting his lot to 
a use incongruous with the use of property in the vicinity, and that no 
power can stop him, for to stop this damage would be to take his property 
without due process of law. If it be said that the owner of a lot in a dis-
trict of homes has the vested right to use it as he sees fit, notwithstanding · 
the damage to his neighbor, then what of the right of his neighbor whose 
property value he destroys? Has one a vested right to destroy, and the 
other no right at all to be protected? In my judgment, the slaughter of 
property value is something the legislature has the power to prevent." 
The next case is Clemetits v. McCabe (Mich., May 10, 1920), 177 N. W. 
722. In October, 1919, Clements applied for a peqnit tq build an automo-
bile serlling station on a lot in Detroit owned by him. There were no build-
ing restrictions on the lot at the time, and he proposed to comply with the 
building code. The neighbors protested to the council, which directed the 
building commissioner not to issue the permit. Plaintiff brought mandamus. 
The city answered that on November 19 an ordinance was passed to zone 
for residential purposes that part of the city in which the lot was located. 
This ordinance provided that when 6o per cent of the frontage on any 
block is used for residential purposes it shall be deemed a· residential zone, 
and it shall thereafter "be unlawful for any person to build any public 
garage, livery, boarding or sale stable, automobile, battery, or accessory serv-
ice station * * * which may be dangerous, offensive, or detrimental to the 
public health, morals, comfort, safety or general welfare of the city in any 
block in which 6o per cent of the frontage of said block is used exclusively 
for residence -purposes." 
Under the "Home Rule" constitutional provision, the city had the power 
"to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns." The 
"Home Rule" act gave authority to provide "for the public peace and health, 
and safety of person and property; for the regulations of trade; * * * for 
the exercise of all municipal powers * * * in the administration of t..lte gov-
ernment, whether expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the 
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interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality 
and its inhabi!ants." The charter provided for a City Planning Commission, 
to divide the city into zones "to carry out a definite plan for the betterment 
of the city" to be adopted by the council. The proposed plan included, first, 
residential; second, residential, commercial, industrial, and unrestricted dis-
tricts. It had not been adopted by the council, but by agreement of counsel· 
it was treated as if it had been. The lower court held the ordinance invalid, 
and directed that the permit be granted. This was affirmed. Steere, J., 
says: ''The zoning power does not now exist, because not expressly con-
ferred by the constitution or the supplemental legislation." It is claimed 
the city has the power under the police power, inherently, by its mere crea-
tion. This power relates to safety, order, morals, for the protection oi 
health, p~son and property; in recent years it has expanded to new sub-
jects which border the debatable line of constitutional rights; this power 
is -an inherent attribute of sovereignty, but it belongs to subordinate gov-
ernmental diVisions only by constitutional or legislative provision; incor-
poration of a city invests it with certain primary police powers funda-
mentally essential to the ends for which it was created, but beyond these 
narrow limits it must be expressly delegated. The power to zone is clearly 
within this debatable sphere; it cannot be implied from mere incorporation; 
there is no hint of such power in the constitution; it is not essential to 
local government; neither is it specifically designated in the Home Rule act; 
this does not authorize the prohibitions necessary in a zoning system; the 
power is to regulate, not prohibit. Such power must be delegated in express 
terms. The court refused to pass on the question whether the legislature 
could grant such power under the present constitution. 
This decision is in accord with the Lachtman case above, and the cita-
tions there given; also with City of St. Louis v. Dorr (18g8), 145 Mo. 466; 
Bostock v. Sams (1902), 95 Md. 400; Stubbs v. Scott (1915), - Md. -, !JS 
Atl. lo6o; Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co. (1916), 129 Md. 202; People e~ rel. 
Realty Co. (1913), 209 N. Y. 434; People v. Roberts (1915), 153 N. Y. Supp. 
143; Quinti11i v. Ma:J•or, Bay St. Louis (1886), 64 Miss. 483,-all being futile 
efforts to create residence districts and exclude therefrom harmless industries, 
5uch as stores, et~. 
Perhaps the most important opinion of the year along these lines is 
In re Opinions of the Justices (Mass., May 20, 1920), 127 N. E. 525, on the 
validity of a proposed zoning act. 
An amendment to the constitution, in 1918, provided: 
"The general court shall have power to limit buildings according to 
their use or construction to specified districts of cities and towns." 
The proposed act provided: 
"A city or town may by ordinance restrict buildings to be used for par-
ticular industries, trade, manufacturing, or commercial purposes to specified 
parts of the city or town, or may exclude from specified parts of the city 
or town, or may provide that such buildings, if situated in certain parts of 
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-the city or town shall be subject to special regulations as to their construction 
and use." 
The act authorized the same to be done with dweiling and tenement 
houses; and for this purpose ''the city or town may be divided into districts 
or zones, ancl the construction and uses of buildings in eaC'h district or zone 
may be regulated as above provided," § l This was to be "carried out in 
such manner as will best promote the health, safety, convenience, and wel-
fare of the inhabitants, will lessen the danger from fire, will tend to improve 
and beautify the city or town, will harmonize with its natural de\'elopment, 
and will assist in carrying out any schemes for municipal improvement put 
forth by any municipal planning board," § 2. 
Provisions were made for a public hearing before the ordinance was 
passed; requiring unanimous vote, in case of objections ; repeal only by 
two-thirds vote; refusal of permit to those not complying; appeal to the 
council or a board; enforcement by injunction. It was uot to apply to 
existing structures. 
As to the effect of the proposed act, the court said: 
"Owners of vacant land in certain parts of the city may be utterly pro-
hibited from erecting a building for any residential use whatever, and be 
compelled to devote. it exclusively to a designated industry." And "other 
land-owners in other specified places may be required to hold their vacant 
land solely for residential purposes and be deprived of the privilege of util-
izing it for commerce, trade or manufacture." · 
The opinion upholding the validity of the propcsed act said: The dele-
gation of power to cities is within the authority of the legislature. Com-
monw. v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 183, l!)O. Independent of the .constitutional pr.c-
vision, under the police power, the exclusion of wooden buildings from fire 
limits, restricting air spaces and distances between outside walls, requiring 
interior fireproof walls, fire escapes, etc., are common and valid. Stevens v. 
Landowner, 228 Mass. 368 Also limitations on the heights of buildings, 
varying according to districts, are valid. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 
affirmed, 214 U. S. 91. 
But under Sec. 2 of the act, "all the considerations there named must 
be given appropriate weight. No one or more, less than all,· can be selected 
as the exclusive basis for action, although the public health, safety, and wel-
fare (defined with some strictness) have each beClll held sufficient ground 
for the exercise of the police power. Commonw. v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545; 
H ole-0mb v. Cramer, 231 Mass. 99, 104-107. 
While the powers given might go beyond the rational limits of the 
police power, it is assumed they will be exercised with a due regard to the 
rights of private property under tjie constitutfon. Town of Lezington v. 
Suburban Land Co., 235 Mass. -, 126 N. E. 36o. 
Aesthetic considerations alone, such as those in Sec. 2, "do. not afford 
sufficient foundation for imposing limitations upon the use of property under 
the police power," James Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202; yet "if 
the primary and substantial purpose of the legislation is such as justifies ,the 
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act, considerations of taste and beauty may enter in as an auxiliary" and 
"in a subsidiary way." Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 375, 214 U. S 9r, 
107; St. Lou'is Poster Adv. Co., 249 U. S. 269. Sec. 2 requires "considera-
tion in due pr_oportion of all the elements named. Enhancement of artistic 
attractiveness * * * can be considered * * * only when the dominant aim in 
the establishment of districts based on use has primary regard to other 
factors lawfully within the police power. After reviewing many cases the 
court concludes, "the proposed statute cannot be pronounced on its face con-
trary to the Federal Constitution or its amendments." Certain kinds of 
business increase the risk of fire, endanger the health and security of those 
living in close proximity, especially of children and the old and feeble; pub-
lic welfare in these matters may be facilitated by the establishment of zones 
for business alone, and "by e..xcluding from areas devoted to residence the 
confusion and danger of fire, contagion and disorder which in greater or 
less degree attach to the location of stores, shops, and factories. * * * The 
proposed act would be constitutional,'' all seven judges concurring. 
In City of St. Paul v. Kessler (Minn., June II, 1920), 178 N. Vv. ~7I, 
defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance by e!i_tablishing a "funeral 
home" in a residence district created under a statute based on the police 
power (instead of eminent domain, as in the Houghton case above). 'fbc 
charter gave power "to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate nuisances; to 
regulate the location of * * * unwholesome houses or places." 
Defendant claimed the act authorizing districting under the eminent 
domain power superseded the authority to do so under the police power, 
and since "funeral homes" were not mentioned in the eminent domain act 
they could not be excluded. The court held ctherwise. 
The ordinance was attacked as depriving defendant of his propertY 
without due process. The court says : "it can be upheld only if it is a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power; that depends on whether the business, if 
properly conducted, is liable to become a unisance; it is legitimate and a 
necessity; it is not a nuisance per se; but there are numerous occupations 
equally necessary, not nuisances per se, that a city may exclude from resi-
dential localities because of their proneness to become injurious to health, 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as 
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, as slaughter 
houses, tanneries, brick kilns, mills. laundries, livery barns, and the like. 
In our opinion, the undertaking business may be put in the same category," 
citing many recent .cases. 
In M)•ers v. Fortunato (Del., Jnne 15, 1920); no Atl. 847, the city of 
Wilmington bad power "to do all those matters and things for the well-
being of the said city" not in contravention of the laws or constitution. An 
ordinance provided that "no permit shall hereafter be granted for the erec-
tion or alteration of * * * any public garage in the residential portion of the 
city * * * within 40 feet of the line of adjoining property, unless the written 
consent of all owners has been filed with the building inspector." The 
defendant got a permit to erect seven garag~s within a rt~sidence section, 
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and began to build without obtaining the consent of the property owners. 
Injunction was asked; demurrer sustained; the city appealed. Reversed. 
The defendant claimed the ordinance was void, (1) as a delegation of 
legislative power, and (2) as unreasonable. As to (1), "the ordinance pro-
hibits the erection of a public garage in the residential portions of the city, 
but allows the prohibition to he removed if the property owners most 
affected comenl. The law is complete in itself wholly independent of what 
anyone may say or do. "' * * 'rhe fact that those most affected may remove 
the prohibition in their favor does not make it a delegation of legislative 
power." 1-Veeks v. lfoerich, 40 App. D. C. 46; Cusark Co. v. City of Chicago, 
242 U. S. 527; compare Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137. As to (2), "the 
reasonableness of an ordinance is a judicial question, * * * when enacted under 
a general or implied power," Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Carlinville, 200 
Ill. 314; but there is not uniformity of decision when there is specific legisla-
tive authority, and the court thinks the ordinance is unreasonable. People v. 
Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368. 
The ordinance was passed under the general welfare clause of the 
charter; it must have for its object the preservation of the public health, 
morals, comfort, safety and welfare; the presumption is in favor of its 
validity; at!tomobiles are noisy machines; frequently emit offensive odors; 
go in and out of public garages at all times of day or 1light, producing noises 
which must interfere with the comfort of those in the immediate vicinity; 
clearly the legislature, in the exercise of. the police power, may authorize 
municipalities to direct their location; and it is not unreasonable to require 
one who wishes to build such a garage to secure the consent of the adjoining 
property owners. The ordinance is valid. 
In LincolK Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp. (N. Y., July 7, 1920), 
128 N. E. 209, the vendor sued _for specific performance, by the vendee, of 
a contract to buy a lot in a residence district. The defense was that the 
title was to be free and clear, and that it was encumbered by a resolution 
of the city council under the zoning law (mentioned above), limiting the 
heights and bulk of buildings, fixing the area of yards, courts, and open 
spaces; restricting the location of buildings according to uses; and estab-
lishing residence, business, and unrestricted districts. The ordinance was 
passed before the contract was made, but the defendant did not know this. 
Held, the ordinance was valid, and each party was bound to know of· its 
existence; It does not create an encumbrance. The court distinguishes 
Anderson v. Steinway, 178 App. Div. 507. The court cites, and by analogy 
relies on, many decisions holding various regulations valid: Village of Car-
thage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268 (the conduct of an individual and the use 
of his property may be regulated) ; Hailacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 
U. S. 394 (manufacture of brick); Reinman v. City of Little Rook, 237 U. S. 
171 (livery stable); Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361 (dairy); Soon Hing v. 
Crowley, II3 U. S. 703 (public laundry); Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 
(bill-hoards in residence districts); Matter of Machintosh v. Johnsofi, 2u N. 
Y. 265 (l{arage); Te11e111ent Hot1se Dept. v.Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325 (sinks and 
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closets in tenements); Grumbach v. Lelands, 154 Cal. 679 (excluding certain 
businesses); Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220 (hay barn, wood yard, laun-
dry); Matter of Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457 (stone crusher, machine shop, 
carpet beating, lumber yard) ; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318 (slaughtering 
animals); City of Rochester v. Guthberlett, 2n N. Y. 309 (disposition of 
garbage); City of Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510 (limiting height of bill-
boards); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 (limiting height of buildings); 
City of Roches'ter v. Macauley, &c., Co., 199 N. Y. 207 (smoke prohibition) ; 
Union Oil Co. v. City of Portland, 1g8 Fed. 441 (storing of oil); and gener-
ally any business, as well as the height and kind of building, may be regu-
1ated under power conierred upon it by the legislature. Hauser v. No. Brit-
ish, &c., Co., 2o6 N. Y. 455. 
A short summary of these cases indicates : 
I. Zoning according to use may be made under the eminent domain 
power, but with conflicting views as to what is a public use (Houghton case, 
above). It would seem the taking here would create an incumbra11ce, 
although it does not under the police power (Lincoln Trust case, above). 
In theory, under eminent domain, a beneficial use is acquired; under the 
police power, a harmful use is prevented. The acquisition of the latter, 
under eminent domain, is a strange sort of "public use." 
2. Zoning may be done under the police power, conferred expressly by 
constitutional and legislative provisions (Opinions of Justices, above). 
3. Zoning may not be done under general or implied police power 
(though expressly claimed in a Home Rule charter); there must be express 
legislative authority (Clements case, above). 
4- Unless the business excluded is a nuisance, or is likely to become 
such, to safety, health, or comfort (Fo1mdry, Kessler, East Cleveland, and 
Myers cases, above). 
5. Zoning may be based on heights and areas of buildings if the publfo 
welfare demands (Swasey case, cited, and Bebb and Lincoln Trust cases, 
above). 
6. Aesthetic considerations alone are not sufficient, as a basis, under 
the police power (Opinions of Justices), and probably not under eminent 
domain (Houghton case), but there is a decided tendency to give it more 
and more weight. 
7. Depreciation of values alone. perhaps, is not sufficient, but that, too, 
is being given greater weight, and seems to be the only substantial basis in 
the Houghton (eminent domain) and Kessl11r (police power) cases above. 
Also the dissenting opinion of Hallam, ]., in- the Lachtman case, cited above. 
H.L.W. 
PRIVJI.!>GED COMMUNICATION BF.'l'W:£:£N PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT-\\l'AIVEJ;.. 
-The case of Maine v. Maryland Casualty Company et al., - Wis.-, 178 
N. W. 749. involves the question of privilege!i communication and its waiver 
under a statute providing that a physician "shall not be permitted to dis-
close any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient 
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in a professional character,'' etc. 'rhe action was brought on an accident 
insurance policy and the testimony of the physician was offered to show that 
the death of the insured was caused accidentally, within the provisions of 
the policy, his information having been gained while acting in his profes-
sional character as the physician of the insured following the accident 
The court holds, in accordance with t}\e general rule, that, notwithstand-
ing the positive character of the statate-"shall not be permitted to disclose" 
-it is to be regarded as a protection to the patient rather han as a mere 
inhibition to the physician, and therefore is a privilege or protection which 
may be wai·1ed by him. 
It is further held that his waiver is not to be implied from the fact that 
the contract of insurance provided for the making of the proofs of death 
as having resulted from causes within the provisions of the policy. It is 
quite uniformly held that these statutory provisions should not be so con-
strued as to defeat the claim of waiver by conduct. Should the patient ask 
his physician or his lawyer to witness his will it is a waiver of the right of 
.the client or patient to have the information gained by the lawyer or phy-
sician while serving him professionally in connection with the execution of 
the will protected from disclosure. This conclusion is arrived at through 
the application of the principle that where the circumstances are such as to 
justify the conclusion that the patient or client could not have expected the 
information to be kept secret, then there is no confidence to be protected. 
Here the insured had made a contract, under which, if he should die, the 
question of the cause of his death would be an important one, and the phy-
sician who should attend him in his last illness would be the person, above 
all others, by whom the cause, of death could be most. appropriately and 
satisfactorily established. But further, his contract requires that the cir-
cumstances of his death shall be disclosed. Is it not a reasonable conclu-
sion that as between himself and his insurer at least he must have under-
stood that those circumstances were not to be kept secret? In which event 
there is no confidence to be betrayed. There is certainly much reason fol' 
concluding that had he actually contemplated the precise question here being 
discussed he would have expected that his physician when called to support 
his contract of insurance would be allowed to testify. 
The court further holds that not only was there no evidence justifying 
a finding that the insured had waived the privilege, but that after his death 
there was no one who could waive it. In this conclusion the court was co11-
'trolled by the authority of Casson v. SchocnfiPld, 166 Wis. 401, L. R. A. 
l918C, 162. The general rule would seem to be contra: John.son v. Fidelity 
'/!;' Casualty Co., 184 Mich. 4o6, L. R. A. l916A, 475 (a case of waiver by 
a beneficiary uncier an insurance policy); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Wiler, loo Ind. 92 (same); Denning v. Butcher, 91 Ia. 425 (executor); Groll 
v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 (any person claiming under deceased); Fraser v. Jen-
nison, 42 Mich. 2o6 (personal representative). 
But the privilege being the insured's and not the insurer's, what right 
has he, the insurer, whose every interest is antagonistic, to raise this ques-
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tion of the insured's privilege? The rule is very clear that it is not for 
either·party to litigation to interfere to prevent a witness from testifying to 
his own guilt of crime, though he is privileged not to do so, and this beca11se 
the privilege is not theirs. R. v. King Lake, II Cox Cr. 500, 22 L. T. R. (N. 
S.) 335; Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379; Cloyes v. Thayer, 3 Hill 564; see 
Wright, J., in Russ v. Steamboat War Eagle, 14 Ia. 363, 375 (involving right 
of party to object that examination of witness involved disclosure of marital 
confidences). Are the circumstances in a case like that under consideration 
so different as to impose an obligation upon one party or the other to pro-
tect the privilege of one to whose interests his .own are diametrically opposed. 
If the testimony is received against the objection of the insurer ~at it is 
privileged, can he assign error on the ruling? Upon what theory can he 
claim to be prejudiced when the privilege was another's and not his own? 
A stranger is not to be heard in protection of the privilege of another while 
living and able to insist upon it or waive it as he may please. Upon what 
theory does death make the stranger the guardian of that privilege? 
One of the most fundamental of procedural principles is that all evidence 
having probative value should be received. While the law is opposed to 
compulsory disclosure of that which it has said may be kept secret, still 
there is no prejudice in the law against disclosure where privilege is not 
claimed. It is to be claimed by whom? Surely not by one in the service of 
his own interest as against that claimed through the one privileged. 
V. H.L. 
TRIAI.-Usr: oi.: UN.PROVF.D MAP oR DtAGR.\M IN ARGUMENT TO THE JURY.-
In the trial of an action for an unlawful entry and detainer, counsel. against 
the objection of the party opposing, in his argument to the jury was allowed 
to use a rough sketch or diagram of the locus in qtlO, made by his client, 
the defendant, for the purpose of assisting the jury to understand the bear-
ing of the testimony in the case. No witness had testified upon inspection 
of the diagram that it correctly represented the situation involved, nor did 
counsel claim that there was such testimony. \Vhat counsel evidently was 
claiming was that the testimony of the witnesses -testifying in the c2se did 
establish the existence of facts illustrated by the diagram. 
It was held by the reviewing court that such use of the diagram in argu-
ment to the jury was proper. Wilson et al. v. McCoy et al. (W. Va, 1920), 
103 s. E. 42. 
In another case reported in the same volume, on a trial for murder in 
which one of the defenses was that the defendant was insane, his counsel 
was allowed by the trial court, against objection ,to use a sketch prepared 
by himself, in his argument to the jury. Considerable testimony was before 
the jury tending to show that several of the blood kindred of defendant, 
on both his father's and mother's side, were or had been insane, and that 
several had ccmmitted suicide. 
Counsel had sketched a "genealogical tree" upon the basis of the testi-
mony of the witnesses in the case, to present graphically these facts, claimed 
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by him to be established by such testimony. While using this sketch for this 
purpose, upon objection by the state that its accuracy was not proven, he 
was stopped and its further use prevented. The court reviewing the tri&1 
sustained the ruling of the lower court. This clearly appears from the 
opinion, although the syllabus of the case makes a directly opposite claim. 
State v. Bramlett (S. C., 1920), 103 S. E. 755. 
These cases are directly opposed in their understanding of the controll-
ing principle, or it is better said, the court in the case last mentioned failed 
to perceive the applicable principle. Of course counsel in argument should 
not be allowed to present facts to the jury and ask it to accept them upon 
the credit of his statement. Counsel does have the right however, to insist 
that the evidence in the case does establish the existence of particular facts 
which it tends to prove, and if he can better assist the jury to appreciate 
his contention by a graphical presentation of his idea than by spoken words 
alone, there is no reasonable objection to his so presenting it. As well might 
he be shackled in hand and foot lest by some gesh1re he make more emphatic 
and clear his contention, or forbidden to use illustration not proven in the 
case, lest the same result should follow. Witnesses are continually being 
allowed to pr_esent their ideas by the use of such aids, and why should not 
counsel have the same right? It is no answer that the witness is speaking 
under oath. True he is tmder oath, and he is not permitted to express his 
ideas unless he is, but counsel is permitted to express his ideas without taking 
any save his official oath. It is nonsense to say that he may present his ideas 
to the jury without oath if he does so by spoken words, but must be under 
oath if he would present them graphically. There can be no possible legal 
objection to the presentation by counsel in argument of a !i,ketch of a ."genea-
logical tree," and pointing out to the jury that the branches indicate the 
several kindred shown by the testimony to have kinship with· a particular 
person, and that certain of those there indicated are by the testimony shown 
to have been insane, or to have committed suicide, where those facts are 
material. V. H. L 
CRntINAL LTABIT.ITY oF CoRPORATIONs.-The present-day tendency of 
ho1ding criminal law applicable to corporations as well as persons in the 
ordinary sense is strikingly shown in State v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (New 
Jersey, 1920), III Atl. 257, where, under an indictment for manslaughter 
by causing a person's death through the negligent handling of a car loadea 
with ammunition, there being no statute involved, it was held that a cor-
poration was indictable. The case has been before the court on several prior 
occasions, and was disposed of by holding that the common law had been 
modified by the decision of Chief Justice Green in State v. Morris & E.~ses 
R. Co. (1852), 23 N. J. L. 36o, and the cases following that decision, and 
that under these authorities the indictment could be sustained. Four mem-
bers of the court dissented, holding that the common law had not been 
changed to this extent, and that this point had not been decided by any of 
these prior decisions. 
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In State v_. Morris, supra, a corporation was indicted for creating a 
nuisance by the obstruction of a highway, and held liable, but the Chief 
Justice said: "A corporation is not liable for a crime of which a 'malus 
animus' is an essential ingredient. The creation of a nuisance involves no 
such element." And Nevius, J., in the concurring ·opinion declared: "It 
was urged that a corporation cannot be guilty of a battery or murder. Be 
it so; yet it does not follow that it may not be guilty of erecting a nuisance." 
In State v. Passaic Co. Agr'l Societ'J•, 54 N. J. L. :z6o, the same question was 
presented, and the court in its affirmative answer said: "It is difficult to see 
how a corporation may be amenable to civil suit for libel, and malicious 
prosecution, and private nuisance, * * * and at the same time not be indict-
able for like offenses where the injury falls upon the }lublic." The majority 
of the court evidently believe that these two cases have given them a rather 
free hand in applying criminal Jaw to corporations, and are willing to go 
very far in holding them liable,. The New Jersey constitution ma.lees tho 
common law the law of the ·state unless changed by statute, and there cer-
tainly is much force in the argument of the minority of tpe court that the 
court should apply the common law unless the legislature sees fit to change it. 
The extent of the criminal liability of a corporation has been in dispute 
from the earliest days. Lord Holt is reported to have said that "a corpora-
tion is not indictable, though the particular members of it are," and although 
this rule has never been admitted, certainly for many years prior to 1840 
the rule was that a corporation could be liable only for non-feasance. State 
v. Great Works Co., 20 Me. 41. In the case of Queen v. Great North of Eng-
land Co., 9 Q. B. R. 315, the English courts-and the American courts in 
decisions to the same effect, Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass., 
33g-extended the liability to matters of commission as wrll as omission. 
with the limitation that "a corporation cannot in general be indicted for 
ordinary crimes and misdemeanors such as involve a criminal or immcral 
irnent, as treason, felony, or breach of the peace, nor for manslaughter, 
assault and battery, nor larceny." 10 CYc. 1231. That these limitations are 
rapidly crumbling away is amply demonstrated by recent cases. The courts, 
when faced with the fact that a corporation could not have a "mens rea," 
imputed the agent's evil intent to the corporation. The courts have held a 
corporation guilty of contempt, Comm. v. Telegram Newspaper Co., 172 
Mass. 294; of criminal libel, People v. Star Co., 135 N. Y. App. Div. 517; 
for keeping a disorderly house, State v. Passaic Co. Agr'l Society, supra; 
for permitting gambling, Comm. v. Pulaski Co. Agr'l Society, 92 Ky. 197; 
for peddling without a license, Standard Oil v. Comm., 21 Ky. L. R. 1~39; 
for violating liquor laws, U. S. v. Joplin Mercantile Co., 213 Fed. 926; for 
conspiracy, U.S. v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223; and in a recent case in the United 
Stat~ Court ·for China, U. S. v. Sin Wan Pao Co., No. 993 ( r920). the 
court said, "there is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporatio:i• a specific 
intent in criminal proceedings than in civil," and held that the guilty intent 
of a Chinese servant of the corporation in accepting, without the knowledge 
of the directors, an obscene advertisement printed in the company's Chinese 
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newspaper, rendered the. corporation liable in criminal proceedings under a 
United States statute. 
That a corporation is not indictable for manslaughter or assault and 
battery, as these crimes involve. an offense against the person, has received 
the sanction. of the courts in Comm. v .Punxsutawney R. Co. (1900), 24 Pa. 
Co. Ct. 25; Comm. v. Ill. Cent. RR. Co. (1913), 152 Ky. 320; Queen v. Gt. 
West Laundry Co. (1900), 3 Can. Crim. Cas. 514- In the Pennsylvania case 
the court held that while a corporation is liable civiliy for assault and bat-
tery committed by an employee, it cannot be indicted criminally for such a 
crim~ nor for manslaughter, saying "some courts have shown a tendency 
to enlarge on the criminal liability of corporations, but no court has gone 
as far as we are urged to go in this case." In People v. Rochester Ry. Co., 
195 N. Y. 102, the court refused to hold a corporation for manslaughter, but 
this was based on the peculiar wording of the New York statute defining 
manslaughter as the killing in a certain way "of one human being by 
another," and it was decided that· the word "another" could only mean 
"another person" in the ordinary sense. 
In contrast to these cases we find Union Colliery Co. v. Queen (1900), 
31 Can. S. C. 81, iill which a corporation was held ·liable for manslaughter 
under a statute, and the common law penally of a fine inflicted, as the statute 
omitted any penalty, and the principle case in which the New Jersey court, 
relying on a line of cases holding a corporation indictable for maintaindng 
a nuisance, holds a corporation indictable for voluntary or involuntary man-
slaughter, thus going as far as the Pennsylvania court refused to go in the 
earlier case. The explanation of these modern decisions is given by Justice 
Bigelow in Comm. v. New Bedford Bridge, supra, that with. the great increl1;5e 
of corporations in modern society "the tendency of the more recent crises 
in courts of the highest authority has been to extend the application of all 
legal remedies to corporations, and assimilate them as far as .possible, in 
their legal duties and responsibilities, to individuals." W. C. O'K. 
MARRitD Wo:i.i:r:N-HusBAND's RIGHT ro, Wrw.'s Sr:RVICES AND 'lo Hr:R 
E·ARNINGS.-A Michigan statute pass<:d in l9II (LAWS OF 19n, ch. 196; Co:M:P. 
LAWS 1915, § n478) provided that a married woman should be "entitled to 
* * * earnings acquired * ** * as the result of her personal efforts." A mar-
ried woman, before 19u, had worked as housekeeper for X and had con-
tinued to work for him after 19u; on· his death she filed a claim against his 
estate for her services during the whole period. Held, she could not recover 
for the period before 19u, as her services and. earnings prior to that date 
belonged to her husband. fo re Mayer's Estate (1920), 210 Mich. 188, 1/7 
N. W. 488. 
Plaintiff and her husband were working on a farm belonging to defendant. 
Plaintiff did the house work, inade blttter, and took care of the chickens. 
She sued defendant for the value of her services after the passage of the 
Act of 19II. Held, that her services .were rendered as a member of her 
husband's family, in her husband's home, and were the ordinary services 
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a farmer's wife renders in his own home. As the Act of 19n refers not to 
such services but to earnings in a separate business carried on by her, or to 
services performed by her for others than her husbar.d, she can therefore 
not recover. Sorensen v. Sorensen (1920), 2II Mich. 429, 179 N. W. 256. 
The husband's right to his wife's earnings, unquestioned at common 
law (Prescott v. Brown, 23 Me. 305), h~s been abolished by statute in most 
states. The Michigan statute cited above was enacted soon after the decision 
in· Root v. Roo't, 164 Mich. 638, which followed the common law rule. Dif-
ferences in the phrasing of the various statutes have led to some contrariety 
of d·ecision, but generally the distinction is made, as in the two principal 
cases, between earnings and services; the .former belong to the wife, thP. 
latter to the husband. The question is usually presented in two types of 
cases: first, in cases of personal injury to the wife, where it must be decided 
whether the wife or the husband is entitled to recover for the wife'.s inability 
to work; second, in l:ases where the ·husband has conveyed property to the 
wife, in payment for her services, and his creditors attack the conveyance 
as voltl1ltary and fraudulent. The wife was held entitled, under such statutes, 
to recover for her loss of ability to work, in Millnwre v. Boston Elev. Co., 
198 Mass. 370 (whether she had ever worked or not); Green v. Muskego" 
&c. Co., 171 Mich. 18 (where she ran a boarding-house); and Texas & P. 
Ry. Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S. 57. And it is generally held, under such cir-
cumstances, that the husband cannot recover for the loss of the wife's earn-
ings outside the home, but that he may recover for the loss of her services 
in the home; this distinction was made in Riley v. Lidtke, 49 Neb. 139; 
GregC'ry v. Oakland, &c., Co., 181 Mich. IOI; and Blair v. Seitner, &c., Co., 
184 Mich. 304. But it is sometimes held·that if the wife is working for the 
husband, even though outside the home (as, for instance, helping him in 
his business), he may recover for the loss of such services. Standen v. 
Penna. R. Co., 214 Pa. St. 189; Georgia, &c., Co. v. Tice, 124 Ga. 459. In 
cases of the second class-fraudulent conveyances:-it has generally appeared 
that the wife's industry was pretty clearly in the nature 9f services, and 
conveyances based thereon have been set aside as voluntary. Coleman v 
Barr, 93 N. Y. 17; Dempster Mill Co. v. Bundy, 64 Kans. 444; Milkman v. 
Arlhe. 221 Fed. 134. commented on in 14 MxcH. L. Rsv. 62. And the same 
result was reached in a recent case in Michigan, even though the wife's 
work was done in connection with the husband's business and a part of it 
was done after the passage of the l9II statute. Henze v. Rogatsky, 199 Mich. 
558. On the other hand, many cases uphold conveyances made under similar 
circumstances. Carse v. Reticker, 95 Iowa 25; McNa11ght v. Anderson, 78 
Ga. 491>; Ford Lumber Co. v. Curd, 150 Ky. 738. E. H.-
